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Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences 
depend on incentives 
 
Samuel Bowles and Sung-Ha Hwang1 
26 February, 2008 
Abstract 
 Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to 
uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable 
allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest.  But 
experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social 
preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or 
crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to 
a public good under these conditions. We identify cases in which a sophisticated planner 
cognizant of these non-additive effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, 
by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.  
JEL: D52 (incomplete markets), D64 (altruism), H21 (efficiency, optimal taxation) H41, (public 
goods) 
Keywords: Social preferences, implementation theory, incentive contracts, incomplete contracts, 
framing, motivational crowding out, ethical norms, constitutions 
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1. Introduction 
 In his Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (1742) David Hume (1964):117-118 
recommended that 
in contriving any system of government ... every man ought to be supposed to be 
a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this 
interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his 
insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to public good.  
Hume's maxim that public policies should harness self-regarding preferences to public ends 
remains a foundation of public economics. Its wisdom is buttressed by ample evidence that 
conventional incentive-based contracts and policies often work very well (Laffont and Matoussi, 
1995; Lazear, 2000).   
 But Hume only “supposed” citizens to be knaves. In recent years experimental evidence 
has endorsed Hume's caveat (immediately following the above passage) that the supposition is 
“false in fact”: altruism, reciprocity, and what the classicals called civic virtues are powerful and 
common motivations (Camerer, 2003; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007; Gintis, et al., 2005). The 
empirical importance of other-regarding motives for public economics has also long been 
recognized and has recently been affirmed in studies of tax compliance (Andreoni, Erand, and 
Feinstein, 1998 ;  Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996 ), political opinion and voting 
concerning income security and redistribution measures (Fong, Bowles, and Gintis, 2005), 
generalized obedience to law (Kahan, 1997), and other areas critical to public economics.  
 Hume, Jeremy Bentham and the other classicals advocating self-interest as a basis of 
public policy design did not ignore the social preferences that underlie moral behavior. What 
Adam Smith termed “the moral sentiments” played a central role in their thinking. But they 
assumed that ethical motivations would be unaffected by incentive-based policies designed to 
recruit self-interest to public ends. Along with civic virtues, explicit incentives and constraints 
could thus contribute additively to good government. According to this view, taxes or subsidies 
affect individual utility and hence behavior only indirectly, that is by altering the economic costs 
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and benefits of the targeted activities. These and other explicit incentives thus do not appear 
directly in the citizen's utility function. As a result the behavioral effects of moral sentiments and 
the material interests are separable, the effects of each being independent of the levels of the 
other.  But when separability does not hold, the two kinds of motivations may be either 
complements -- social preferences being heightened by incentives appealing to self interest -- or 
substitutes, when explicit incentives are said to crowd out social preferences.  
A consequence of the classicals’ implicit 'separability assumption' is that they failed to 
take account of how harnessing self -interest to the public good might either compromise or 
enhance civic virtues. While in contemporary economic theory separability is not explicitly 
assumed and could be abandoned, modern public economics, mechanism design and related 
fields continue the classicals’ practice. However a great many experiments and observations in 
natural settings suggest that social preferences are often important influences on behavior, and 
that the salience of these preferences varies with the kinds of explicit incentives that are 
implemented.  
If the separability assumption is false, policies designed on its basis will generally be 
non-optimal, and explicit incentives will be over-used or under-used. Over-use of explicit 
incentives when crowding out is the case was the central theme of the study of blood donations 
by Richard Titmuss (1971).  In similar vein Albert Hirschman (1985):10 castigated economists 
who propose “to deal with unethical or anti-social behavior [solely] by raising the cost of that 
behavior…[because they] think of citizens as consumers with unchanging or arbitrarily changing 
tastes” adding that “A principal purpose of publicly proclaimed laws and regulations is to 
stigmatize antisocial behavior and thereby to influence citizens’ values and behavioral codes.” 
The implications for constitutional design of cases in which “institutions themselves affect 
preferences” were first developed by Michael Taylor (1987):177 and subsequently expanded by 
Bowles (1989), Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1995), Kreps (1997),  Frey (1997), Bowles (1998),  
Cooter (1998), Ostrom (2000), and Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2005).   
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The economic intuition underlying Titmuss’ and Hirschman’s concerns is that because 
crowding out reduces the effectiveness of explicit incentives, they would be used less by a 
sophisticated social planner cognizant of the crowding out problem, by comparison to a  naive 
planner, namely, one who assumes that economic and moral motives are separable.  If crowding 
out is so strong that the incentive has an effect the opposite of its intent, this is of course the case. 
But the effect of crowding out need not be literally counterproductive in this sense and where the 
effectiveness of incentives is blunted but not reversed, the implications for the optimal use of 
incentives are far from obvious.  The reduced effectiveness of the incentive associated with 
crowding out would entail a larger incentive for a planner designing a subsidy to ensure 
compliance with a quantitative target, a given fraction of the population receiving anti-flu 
injections for example. We will show that these seemingly conflicting intuitions are both correct. 
To do this we develop a model of optimal explicit incentives in the presence of both crowding in 
and crowding out, and use the model to identify cases in which crowding out entails greater or 
lesser use of incentives. 
To analyze these cases we will ask what incentives would be adopted by a social planner 
who wishes to maximize the aggregate utility of citizens. (By “incentives” without adjective we 
mean those appealing to conventional self-regarding preferences.)  We will say that incentives 
are over-used if the sophisticated planner who takes account on non-separability would adopt a 
lesser level of incentive than would the naive planner, and conversely.  
In the next section we survey the empirical literature on non-separability. We then 
introduce a model of public incentives when individuals with social preferences may contribute 
to a public good, using this model to clarify the separability assumption and how it may be 
violated. In section 4 we use the model to show that the sophisticated social planner seeking to 
ensure a target compliance level of contributions by citizens will implement a higher level of 
incentives (or none at all) if crowding out holds. In section 5 we study optimal incentives for the 
sophisticated planner who maximizes total social welfare, including the values of the citizens 
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both as components of their utility and influences on their behavior.  We find that in a public 
goods setting, as in the compliance case, the sophisticated planner may make more use of 
incentives than the naive planner when crowding out is the case. The economic intuition behind 
this surprising result is evident in the compliance case. In cases where the marginal social 
benefits of the public good rise sharply as the shortfall from its socially optimal level increases (a 
limiting case of which is the target compliance problem), the fact that crowding out makes the 
incentive less effective requires its greater use. Where decreasing marginal returns to the public 
good are modest or absent the sophisticated planner will make lesser use of incentives when 
crowding out holds, as expected. In section 6 we consider the implications of non-separability for 
public economics. 
2. When separability fails; evidence and explanations 
The underlying social and psychological mechanisms accounting for non-separability 
include the following. (Bowles(2008) and Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the experimental and 
other evidence.)  
First, explicit incentives may frame a decision setting as one in which self-interested 
optimization rather than ethical behavior is appropriate (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, et al., 
1994 ; Irlenbusch and Sliwka, 2005 ; Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis, 2000 ; Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000a ; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  
Second, the incentives adopted by a principal unavoidably provide information about the 
principal's preferences as well as the nature of the task to be done and his beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the agent or other aspects of the agent's likely behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 
2003 ; Seabright, 2004).  The use of explicit incentives may thus convey distrust or other 
negative beliefs or attitudes by the principal towards the agent or may reveal that the principal 
would like to profit unfairly at the expense of the agent, thereby compromising the agent's 
preexisting predispositions of reciprocity or obligation toward the principal (Falk and Kosfeld, 
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2006; Fehr and List, 2004; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). The presence of incentives may also 
reduce the value of generous or civic minded acts as a signal of one’s moral character (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2006). 
Third, rewards closely linked to performance may result in what psychologists term 
'over-justification' which, by compromising the individual's sense of self-determination, may 
degrade intrinsic motives to perform well (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999; Cameron, Banko, 
and Pierce, 2001; Frey, 1994).   The experiment of  Mellstrom and Johannesson, (2008)  suggests 
that Titmuss may have been right about this for the case of women potential blood donors (but 
not men). 
Fourth, the incentives adopted by a principal influence the process by which agents invest 
in identities and update their preferences and may bias it in a self-interested direction (Ben-
Porath, 1980; Bohnet, Frey, and Huck, 2001; Bowles, 1998; Falkinger et. al., 2000; Gaechter, 
Kessler, and Konigstein, 2007; Bar-Gill and Fershtman, 2005).   
Fifth, explicit incentives may also crowd in ethical and other social preferences, as for 
example when members of a community prefer to contribute to a public good conditional on 
others contributing, and the presence of explicit incentives to contribute affects their beliefs 
about the actions likely to be taken by other members (Shinada and Yamagishi, 2007; Gaechter 
and Falk, 2002; Rodriguez-Sickert, Guzman, and Cardenas, 2007).  
 
3. Moral sentiments and material interests as complements or substitutes 
 We abstract from these diverse reasons why separability may fail and simply attribute to 
citizens a set of 'values' that may motivate pro-social behaviors and let these values be influenced 
(positively or negatively) by the use of explicit incentives.  Consider a community of identical 
individuals indexed by 1,...,i n=  who may contribute to a public project by taking an action 
( [0,1]ia ∈ ) at a cost ( )ig a  which is non-negative, increasing and convex in its argument.  The 
output of the project depends on each member’s contribution, 1 2( , ,..., )na a af  and explicit 
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incentives take the form of a subsidy 0s ≥  proportional to the amount contributed. 
Implementing the subsidy entails administrative, monitoring and other costs ( )c s  that are 
increasing in the level of the subsidy because higher values of s  increase the citizens’ incentive 
to misrepresent their contribution level. We suppose that payment of the taxes supporting the 
subsidy has no effect on citizens’ behavior and can be ignored. The net social cost of the subsidy 
is thus just what we call its administrative cost namely, ( )c s . 
We refer to ethical, other-regarding and other social preference influences on behavior as 
'values' and represent them by ( , )iv a s .  For clarity we refer to the benefits and costs other than 
values (the cost of contributing and receiving and administering subsidies as well as the benefits 
of the project) as “material”. To isolate the problem of non-separability and allow its 
representation in a single parameter we abstract from individual differences in the effects of 
incentives on values and give the values function an explicit form 
(1) ( )iv a v sl= +  
so the marginal effect of i ’s contributing on i ’s  values is iav v sl= + . The classical 
separability assumption maintains that the level of explicit material incentives does not influence 
the marginal value utility of contributing: that is 0l = . We do not consider the case of taxes ( i.e. 
0<s ) because motivational crowding is not symmetrical: in experiments, both bonuses and 
fines crowd out social preferences (thought typically in different degree) so one cannot reverse 
the crowding effect by adopting taxes rather than subsidies.  
Not all of the complex psychological mechanisms accounting for non-separability are 
captured by this simple formulation; for example it precludes plausible cases in which simply the 
presence of the incentive has a substantial effect on values even if the incentive is arbitrarily 
small (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b) or where the effect of incentives on values depends on the 
actions or values of others. For example in the employer employee gift exchange experiment of  
Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) subjects' effort responses to variations in piece rates closely 
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approximated those predicted on the basis of simple payoff maximization, but  effort levels  were 
higher in the complete absence of piece rates, the apparent framing effect of which negatively 
affected motivation, equivalent to a shift downwards of v  in our equation (1). However our 
formulation illustrates the fundamental problem when values and incentives are either 
complements or substitutes and provides a tractable way to study the implications for mechanism 
design.  
Using (1) individual i ’s utility is  
(2) ( )1 2, ,.., ( ) ( , )i n i i ia a au sa g a v a sf= + − +  
Varying ia  to maximize iu  for given values of s  and the others’ contributions, the individual's 
best response ia   is given by 
(3) ( ) ii ag a s v sf l′ = + + +  
where the left hand side is the private marginal material cost of contributing and the remaining 
(right hand side) terms are private marginal material benefits arising from the project and from 
subsidies, and the marginal value benefits associated with the individual’s contribution. To rule 
out corner solutions we assume throughout that (1)g′  and (0)g′  are (respectively) sufficiently 
large and sufficiently small so that the value of a  satisfying the citizen’s best responses lies in 
the unit interval.  
From (3) the effect of the subsidy on the individual’s contribution (given the contributions 
of others) is then   
(4) 1
i i
i
a a
a
s g
l
f
∂ += ′′∂ −  
where the denominator is positive by the second order condition of the individual’s optimization 
problem (in the case of a convex benefit function for the public project, requiring that the 
marginal costs of contributing be rising faster than the marginal private material benefits).   
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Where the separability condition does not hold, we have either crowding in ( 0l > ) or 
crowding out ( 0l < ). Under crowding in, values and incentives are complements, as increased 
use of the incentive enhances the marginal effect of contributing on one’s values and by (4) 
increases the effect of the subsidy on the citizen’s action. Crowding out makes incentives and 
values substitutes, reducing the effect of incentives on the citizens’ behavior.  If 1l < − , which 
we term strong crowding out, the incentive reduces contributions. Strong crowding out is evident 
the Haifa day care case and other experiments surveyed in Bowles (2008) in which incentives 
had the opposite of the intended effect. But it is clear from equation (4) that a positive response 
by subjects to explicit incentives does not indicate that crowding out is absent; it indicates only 
that 1l > − .  
 We can now clarify the distinction between the naive and the sophisticated planner. The 
subsidy adopted by the naive planner who assumes separability is denoted, Ns and this subsidy is 
obviously equal to the sophisticated planner’s optimal subsidy *( )s l  in the case that the 
separability assumption is true, so N *(0)s s= . Then we say that incentives are under-used if 
* Ns s>  and conversely.  
Because we wish to model the under-provision of a public good when only private 
incentives are in force, and the possible implementation of a superior outcome through a 
publically implemented incentive, we make the following assumptions 
1. Values alone are insufficient to internalize the external benefits of contributing to the 
public good: in the absence of a subsidy, the marginal benefits that one’s contributions 
confer on others in the community exceed the marginal value utility of contributing, or 
( 1) ian vf− >  
2. The individual cannot experience a negative valuation of contributing unless strong 
crowding out holds: v s≥ , which insures that ( , ) 0v a s ≥  for all 1l > − . 
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4. Ensuing compliance  
To explore the effects of non-separability we first study a problem of securing 
compliance with a target level of citizen contributions. Suppose a social planner seeks to ensure 
at least cost that at least p  percent of the population contribute some minimum, a . For 
concreteness suppose the action is training in first aid, measured in hours, and a social planner 
knows that in the absence of a subsidy this will not occur.  He is constrained not to discriminate 
among the citizens and so considers a subsidy s  applied to each hour of training received by the 
citizens where ( )c s  is the cost of determining the number of hours contributed by each. We 
suppose that the benefit function takes the following form. 
(5) 1 2( , ,..., )n i i
i
a a a af f= ∑  
where  if  is a constant that may differ among individuals as the public benefits of  an individual 
having first aid knowledge differ. Then individual i ’s utility is  
(6) ( )i j j i i i i
j
u a sa g a a v a sf l= + − + +∑  
Therefore the individual’s best response is given by 
(7) ( )i ig a s v sf l′ = + + +  
To identify the marginal individual (assumed to be unique) who must contribute a  in 
order to secure the compliance target of the planner we reorder the index such that i jf f≤  for 
i j< .  The marginal individual is then i  where i  is the smallest number, i , satisfying 
(1 )i n p> − . The case of interest is that in which the critical individual's values and own benefits 
from contributing are insufficient to motivate his attaining the target in the absence of the 
subsidy (that is ( ) ig a vf′ > + ). Then the social planner will choose *( ) 0s l =  if 1l ≤ − , 
abandoning the target as unattainable by use of the subsidy, and otherwise select the subsidy 
satisfying 
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(8) * *( ) ( ) ( )ig a s v sf l l l′ ≤ + + +  
Since providing the subsidy is costly, if it is used at all the social planner will choose the 
minimum *( )s l  satisfying (8). 
(9) * ( ) ( )( )
1
ig a v
s
fl
l
′ − += +  
The naive planner believes that 0l =  and hence adopts N ( ) ( )is g a vf′= − +  as his 
preferred subsidy. From (9) we have 
 N *( if and only if -1< <0s s l) l<  
In case of crowding out (in), the sophisticated planner uses the incentive more (less) than the 
naive planner. 
 5. Optimal incentives for the provision of a public good 
We turn now to the problem of the planner who seeks to maximize the sum of citizens' 
utilities by adopting an optimal incentive in the presence of a public goods problem, in which the 
levels of contribution of each citizen to a public good may affect the marginal benefits of other 
citizens' contributions.  The output of the project varies with the sum of the contributions of the 
members and each member receives an amount: 
(10) ( )1 2( , ,..., ) jn jaa a af f= ∑  
where f  is increasing in its argument.  
We model a two-stage optimization process in which the planner selects a subsidy level 
to maximize citizens' utility, taking account of the effect of the subsidy on the citizens’ Nash 
equilibrium contribution levels (assumed known to the planner.)   We derive the individual 
citizen’s best response as in the case of equation (3) and solve for all of the contribution levels, 
ia  to find a Nash equilibrium given a subsidy s . Because citizens are identical and experience a 
rising marginal cost of contribution, the planner will implement a symmetric equilibrium. Thus 
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the individual’s Nash equilibrium contribution (denoted as *a , suppressing the individual 
subscript) satisfies the following condition: 
(11) ( )* *( )g a na s v sf l′ ′= + + +  
Using (11) we can find the effect of the incentive on citizens’ Nash equilibrium contributions.  
(12) 
* 1a
s g n
l
f
∂ += ′′ ′′∂ −  
where the derivatives of g′′  and f′′  are evaluated at *a  and *na  respectively and the asymptotic 
stability of the Nash equilibrium requires the denominator to be positive. Equation (12) differs 
from the partial effect of the subsidy on an individual’s contribution (e.g. equation (4)) because it 
takes account of the reciprocal influence of the actions of all other citizens on one’s own 
incentives to contribute, thereby capturing the full effect of the incentive in displacing the Nash 
equilibrium level of contributions. The effect of the subsidies is diminished if the benefit 
function (10) is concave and multiplied if it is convex, as expected. Like equation (4), equation 
(12) confirms that strong crowding out precludes the use of the incentive, as the planner will 
adopt the incentive only if it affects citizen behavior in the intended direction. 
We model the behavior of a single citizen in response to the planner’s choice of s  to 
maximize the social welfare function: 
(13) * * *( ) ( , )) ( ( , )) ( ( , ), ) ( )s na s g a s v a s s c sw f( l l l= − + −  
The optimal incentive is given by 
(14) *( ) arg max ( )
s
s sl w=  
so the planner chooses a subsidy satisfying 
(15) 
*
* * *( , )) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ) 0an na s g a s v s a s c s
s
f ( l l l l l∂′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤− + + + − =⎣ ⎦ ∂  
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The first term in the left hand expression is the net indirect effect of the change in contributions 
induced by variation in the subsidy, showing that planner takes account of the fact that for the 
individual the value benefits partially offset the material costs of contributing. The second term 
is the direct (positive or negative) effect of the incentive on values. The final term is the marginal 
administrative cost.   
Using (11), we find that the individual’s marginal cost of contributing net of the marginal 
value benefits, namely,  g v sl′ − −  is just sf +′ . Making this substitution in (15) and using (12) 
we see that the optimal subsidy is either zero or the positive value of s  satisfying (16) so as to 
equate marginal benefits of the subsidy to its marginal costs:  
(16) [ ] *(1 )( 1) ( ) 0
marginal costmarginal benefit
n s a c s
g n
lf l
f
+′ ′− − + − =′′ ′′− ???????????????
 
where we suppress the arguments of *, , ,g af f′ ′′ ′′ . The second order condition is satisfied if the 
marginal benefit function is declining in s  and the marginal cost function is constant or 
increasing, as is shown in figure 1.   
Figure 1. Effect of crowding out for the optimal incentives. The figure depicts equation (16), 
the determination of the planner’s optimal incentive and the effect of a reduction in l   
MB( )l
MC
*( )s l
s  
MB, MC  
(FOC) 0
l
∂ <∂
 
(FOC) 0
l
∂ >∂
 
2MB( )l
1MB( )l
*
1( )s l * 2( )s l
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To determine the effect of variations in l  on *s  we totally differentiate (16), the first 
order condition (FOC) with respect to s  and l  and evaluate the result at *s . Thus we have 
(17) 
* (FOC) /
(FOC) /
ds
d s
l
l
∂ ∂= − ∂ ∂  
From the second order condition of the planner’s optimum problem we know that the 
denominator is negative, so the sign of the effect of non-separability on the optimal level of 
incentives is given by (FOC)/ l∂ ∂ , that is, whether crowding out – a decrease in in l  – shifts the 
marginal benefit function in figure 1 upwards or downward. In the case shown by the dashed line, 
crowding out shifts the marginal benefit function down and thus entails a lesser use of the 
incentive. This captures the economic logic of Titmuss' and Hirschman's critique of the use of 
incentives mentioned at the outset.  
What drives this result is that a decline in l  reduces the effectiveness of the subsidy, 
which (as can be seen from equation (16)) reduces the marginal benefit of the subsidy. But closer 
inspection of equation (16) (see appendix) makes it clear that variations crowding out may have 
the opposite and less intuitive effect that crowding out induces greater use of the incentive. A 
reduction in l  reduces total contributions to the public good and if the marginal public benefits 
from contribution are diminishing in the total contributed ( 0f′′ < ) then f′  will increase, possibly 
offsetting the reduced effectiveness of the incentive and shifting the marginal benefit function 
upwards, thus entailing a greater use of the subsidy.   
Thus the sign of FOC/ l∂ ∂  cannot be determined in general, and crowding out may either 
increase or decrease the subsidy adopted by the sophisticated planner. To explore the counter-
intuitive case in which crowding out results in greater use of the incentive, we adopted specific 
but plausible utility, cost, and public project functions and varied l . Figure 2 shows results for a 
concave public goods benefits function, with two functions, one representing the planner’s 
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marginal benefits of variations in the subsidy under crowding out, and the other under 
separability. Here crowding out results in an upward shift in the marginal benefit function 
resulting in greater use of the incentive and confirming the intuition in the previous paragraph. 
Panel B gives the citizen's best response function and the resulting levels of contribution under 
separability and crowding out. Panel C presents the optimal level of subsidy as a function of l . 
Notice that as l  approaches -1 the optimal subsidy rises at an increasing rate, reaches a 
maximum and then declines to 0 (when l  = -1). The sharp decline is occasioned by the fact that 
as l  falls, the marginal benefits function becomes increasingly flat, so that shifts upwards or 
downwards in it produce increasingly large shifts in *s . Panel D contrasts this case with one 
based on a linear public goods production function, in which, as anticipated *s  is monotonically 
increasing in l  (The simulation and analysis of equation (17) are presented in more technical 
detail in the appendix.) 
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Figure 2. Under-use of incentives under crowding out. We use the following functions and 
parametric values for the simulation of *( )s l : denoting x as  the total contribution of citizens, 1/ 4( )x xf = , 
10000n = , 1v = , ( ) 1.03 /(1 )g a a a= − , ( ) 1.7c s s= . Details of the computations are in the appendix. In 
Panel A, the marginal benefit and the marginal cost are presented; the downward solid line shows the 
marginal benefit when 0l =  whereas the dashed line is the marginal benefit in case of 0.9l = − . The 
horizontal line in Panel A is the marginal cost. Panel B depicts the resulting contribution levels of citizens, 
namely the graph of *( )a s  given values of l . Grid lines in Panel A and Panel B show the optimal choices 
of *s  and the determination of *a  given the specified values of l ; 0l = , * 0.671s = , * 0.215a = ; 
0.9l = − , * 0.769s = , * 0.024a = . Panel C shows the graph of *( )s l . Finally, Panel D shows *( )s l  when 
f  is linear: ( ) 0.001x xf = . 
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*( )s l  when 1/ 4( )x xf =  
*( 0)a l =  
*( 0.9)a l = −
*( )s l  when ( ) 0.001x xf =
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6.   Conclusion: Public economics in light of behavioral economics  
 Incentives work. This is particularly true of positive incentives to engage in activities for 
which there is little or no pre-existing motivation or ethical obligation, and for negative 
incentives that avoid conveying unfavorable information about the type or intentions of the 
individual implementing the incentives. In some experiments, the magnitude of the response to 
variations in a given incentive structure closely approximates what one would expect based on 
conventional self-regarding preferences alone (for example, Anderhub, Gaechter, and Konigstein, 
2002, Falkinger, et. al., 2000). But the experimental evidence also suggests that the socially 
beneficial effects of public-spirited motives may be either enhanced or diminished by policy 
interventions that are designed by a naive social planner to more closely align self-regarding 
incentives with social objectives.    
We have shown that the sophisticated planner may use an explicit incentive either more 
or less than a naive planner depending on the nature of the mechanism design problem. If the 
planner’s problem is compliance with a target, a higher level of incentive use is optimal if 
crowding out holds (by comparison with the separable case, and as long as strong crowding out 
does not hold). The reason is that crowding out makes the incentive less effective, so that to 
attain the target, more incentive is needed. By contrast, if the problem is to maximize citizens’ 
utility including their values, then the sophisticated will make either greater or lesser use of 
incentives by comparison to the naive planner when crowding out holds, leading to policies that 
are less effective than anticipated, or (in the case of strong crowding out) may even be 
counterproductive in that their effects are opposite of those intended. The sophisticated planner 
may make greater use of incentives when crowding out occurs if the benefit function exhibits 
strongly diminishing returns. The same result holds if the sophisticated planner (as above) takes 
account of the behavioral effects of non-separability, but does not include the citizens' values as a 
component of the social welfare function and maximizes the material net benefits of the project 
namely  ( ) ( ) ( )na g a c sf − − . 
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One may conclude, then, that while explicit incentives do a tolerably good job in many 
situations, in others performance would be improved if mechanism design took account of the 
effects of incentives on preferences.  Social preferences are a variable resource for the policy 
maker, one that may be either empowered or diminished by legislation and public policy.  
This is the foundation of Hirschman’s suggestion (quoted at the outset) that, counter to 
conventional economic logic, prohibitions may be superior to incentives of the type modeled 
here, even when the expected material marginal cost of anti-social behavior is identical under the 
two mechanisms. The reason is that by explicitly proclaiming a behavior as anti-social, a 
prohibition may be complementary with individual values, affirming a citizen’s moral 
predisposition to not behave anti-socially rather than crowding out moral sentiments as may be 
the case of conventional incentives. The “obligation effect” on preference represents an upward 
shift in our value function induced by an increase in v . Experimental evidence is consistent with 
this commonplace wisdom of legal theory (Kahan 1997). Roberto Galbiati and Pietro Vertova 
(2008, in press and 2008) show that subjects faced with fines for under-contributing and rewards 
for contributing more than a stated obligation respond positively to variations in the obligation 
despite the fact that the incentives to contribute are unaffected. The obligations effect works in 
part through the subjects' beliefs about what others will do, and in part through an independent 
effect of obligations on preferences.  
Taking account of social preferences in mechanism design may be especially important in 
heterogeneous populations.  Optimal design in these cases will typically involve more complex 
instruments than the uniform and linear subsidy we have studied. For example, if the 
sophisticated planner knew the crowding parameter l  (in equation(1)) of each citizen (assuming 
that these differed across individuals), differential subsidies could be devised to maximize the 
effect of the subsidy for a given cost, using equation (12). Such discrimination among citizens 
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based on their values requires information not generally available and in any case might violate 
liberal legal and ethical norms however and prove politically infeasible.   
Of greater practical relevance are situations where citizens differ in v , so that the 
population is made up of both self-regarding and civic-minded individuals as is suggested by 
experimental evidence. In this case some mechanisms provide incentives that induce even the 
civic-minded to act as if they were selfish. Examples include anonymous competitive markets 
with parametric prices as well as public goods environments without opportunities for peer 
monitoring and sanctioning of non-contributors (Sobel, 2007; Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr, 
2003). Other mechanisms, such as the public goods game with peer punishment, may induce the 
self-interested to act as if they were civic-minded (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Gaechter and Falk, 
2002 ; Carpenter et al, 2008).  
This suggests an extension of Hume’s maxim:  Good policies and constitutions are those 
that support socially valued ends not only by harnessing selfish preferences, but also by evoking, 
cultivating and empowering public-spirited motives. This will be particularly important where 
critical information is non-verifiable so that contracts are incomplete and the reach of 
governmental fiat is limited. The reason is that in these cases as Kenneth Arrow (1971):22  put it: 
“norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes (may) ...compensate for market 
failures.”  
 Where this is the case, as we have seen, conventional incentive-based interventions may 
be worse than ineffective, motivating a norm-related analogue to the second best theorem due to 
Richard Lipsey and Kevin Lancaster (1956-1957): where contracts are incomplete (and hence 
socially beneficial values may be important in attenuating market failures), public policies and 
legal practices designed to more closely align self-regarding preferences and public objectives  
may exacerbate the underlying market failure (by undermining social values  such as trust or 
reciprocity) and may result in a less efficient equilibrium allocation.  A constitution for knaves, 
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Bruno Frey (1997) observed, may produce knaves, just as Taylor (1987) had earlier suggested 
that the Hobbesian state may produce Hobbesian man.  
 
 
Appendix 
1.  Derivation of *( , )a s l  
Given (10), the individual’s best response ia  satisfies the following equation. 
(A1) ( ) ) for 1,...,i j
j
g a a s v s i nf ( l′ ′= + + + =∑  
Equation (A1)  defines implicitly the individual i ’s best response given others’ contribution and 
by solving the n  equations in (A1), we can find Nash equilibrium, 1* *( ,...., )na a , for the public 
goods game among n  citizens.  Since we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium, by setting 
*ia a=  for all i , we find the condition for *a as in equation  (11). Now equation  (11)  defines 
*a  implicitly in terms of s  and l  and we denote this solution as *( , )a s l . To find the effect of 
the subsidy and crowding out on the individual’s Nash contribution , we substitute *( , )a s l  for 
*a  in (11) and take the derivatives of this expression with respect to s  and l . 
(A2) 
* *1 ,a a s
s g n g n
l
f l f
∂ + ∂= =′′ ′′ ′′ ′′∂ − ∂ −  
2.  Simulation of *( )s l  
To construct *( , )a s l , we divide the domains of s , [0,1], and l , [-1,1],  into 100 subintervals, 
respectively (in total 2100  rectangles), solve for the optimal choices of citizens given each value 
of s  and l  at the endpoints of these subintervals, and construct an interpolation of these values. 
Using the resulting values of *( , )a s l (shown for two values of l  in figure 2B), we find the 
optimal choices of social planners given l  (using 1000 subdivisions of interval [-1,1] ) and 
interpolate  *s  to obtain the function *( )s l (shown in figure 2C for the concave benefits function 
and in 2D for the linear benefits function). 
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3.  First order condition for social planner’s optimization problem 
(A3) 
( )
2
2
*
3
FOC 1 (1 )(( 1) ) ( 1)
( )
I II
( )(( 1) )(1 )
III IV
s
n s n n
g n g n
s g n
a n s s
g n g n
lf f
l f f
l ff l
f f
∂ +′ ′′= − − + −′′ ′′ ′′ ′′∂ − −
′′′ ′′′−′+ + − − − +′′ ′′− ′′ ′′−
????????? ?????????
?????? ??????????????
 
 
where we suppress the arguments of *, , ,g af f′ ′′ ′′  
The first term (I) represents variations in the effectiveness of the incentive induced by the 
variation in l  multiplied by the marginal social benefits of contributions. This term must be non-
negative by assumptions 1 and 2.  The second term (II) represents the variation in these marginal 
benefits associated with the change in the level of contributions induced by the variation inl . 
This will be negative if the benefit function is concave: a decrease in l , for example, induces 
lesser contributions, which in this case raise the marginal social benefits of contribution. The 
third term (III) is the effect of variations in l  on the direct effect of the incentive on values, 
composed itself of a direct effect of variations in l (that is, *a ) and an indirect effect via the 
effect of variations in l  on the level of contribution (l /( )s g nf′′ ′′− ). This term is non-negative 
for 0l =  but in general may have either sign.  The last term (IV) represents the effect of the non-
linearity of the citizens’ best response function *( )a s . The term, 2g n f′′′ ′′′− , will be zero if both 
g′′′  and f′′  are zero (and as a result *( )a s  is linear), while taking a positive sign if *( )a s  is 
concave. As expected, concavity of the individual's best response function works in the same 
direction as concavity of the benefits function.  
The magnitudes of these four terms vary with l  as indicated in figure A1 panel A. The 
sum of these terms is shown in panel B, positive values indicating an upward shift in the 
marginal benefit function induced by an increase in l , and a zero value occuring at the values of 
l  for which (from figure 2)  *s  is at a maximum ( 0.912l = − ) and at a local minimum 
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( 0.345l = ). At the levels of *s  implied by these values of l  variations in l  rotate the marginal 
benefit function around the point at which it intersects the marginal cost function leaving *s  
unchanged.  
 
 
 
Figure A1. Effects of term I~IV and total effect. The functions and parameters used: 1/ 4( )x xf = , 
10000n = , 1v = , ( ) 1.03 /(1 )g a a a= − , ( ) 1.7c s s= .  
 
4. Maximum optimal subsidy at high rates of crowding out. 
The explanation in the text of the determination of *s  for values of l  approaching strong 
crowding out is illustrated in figure A2 showing the changes in the marginal benefit functions 
depending various values of l , and hence the determination of optimal incentives, *s . Notice 
that as l  moves from 0 to -.912,  *s  increases and then as l  falls still further to -.94 it declines.  
term I 
A: Effects of Term I~IV B: Total Effect 
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Figure A2. The functions and parameters used: 1/ 4( )x xf = , 10000n = , 1v = , ( ) 1.03 /(1 )g a a a= − , 
( ) 1.7c s s= . The optimal incentives are as follows: 0l = , * 0.671s = ; 0.912l = − , * 0.771s = ; 0.94l = − , 
* 0.730s =  
 
 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
s
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2.0
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3.0
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MC 
MB( 0.912)l = −
MB( 0.94)l = −
MB( 0)l =
 24 
 
Works cited 
 
Anderhub, V., Gaechter S., Konigstein M., 2002. Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple 
Principal Agent Experiment.  Experimental Economics 5 (1), 5-27. 
Andreoni, J., Erand B., Feinstein J., 1998. Tax Compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 36 
(2), 818-60. 
Arrow, K. J., 1971. Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities. In: M. 
D. Intriligator (Ed.). Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. Amsterdam: North Holland, 3-
23. 
Bar-Gill, O., Fershtman, C., 2005. The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences. Journal 
of Public Economic Theory 7 (5), 841-857. 
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2003. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of  Economic Studies, 
70, 489-520. 
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic Review 
96 (5), 1652-1678 
Ben-Porath Y., 1980. The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of 
Exchange. Population and Development Review 6(1), 1-30. 
Bohnet, I., Frey, B., Huck, S., 2001. More Order with Less Law: On Contractual Enforcement, 
Trust, and Crowding. American Political Science Review 95 (1), 131-44. 
Bowles, S., 1989. Mandeville's Mistake: Markets and the Evolution of Cooperation. Presented to 
the September Seminar, University College, London. 
Bowles, S., 1998. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other   
Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), 75-111. 
Bowles, S., 2008. Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine “the moral 
sentiments”:evidence from economic experiments. Science, in press. 
Camerer, C., 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experimental Studies of Strategic Interaction. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cameron, J., Banko K., Pierce W. D., 2001. Pervasive negative effects of rewards on intrinsic 
motivation: The myth continues. Behavior Analyst, Special Issue 24 (1), 1-44. 
 25 
 
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund J. K., Willis C. E., 2000. Local Environmental Control and 
Institutional Crowding-out. World Development 28 (10), 1719-33. 
Carpenter, J., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2008. Strong Reciprocity and Team Production. Working 
Paper, Santa Fe Institute 
Cooter, R., 1998. Expressive Law and Economics. Journal of Legal Studies 27, 585-608. 
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. M., 1999. A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments 
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation. Psychological 
Bulletin 125 (6), 627-68. 
Falk, A., Kosfeld, M., 2006. The Hidden Costs of Control. American  Economic  Review 96 (5), 
1611-30. 
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gaecter, S., Winter-Ebmer, R., 2000. A simple mechanism for the 
efficient provision of public goods. American Economic Review, 90 (1), 247-64 
Fehr, E., Gaechter, S., 2000. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. 
American  Economic Review 90 (4), 980-94. 
Fehr, E., Klein, A., Schmidt, K. M., 2007. Fairness and Contract design. Econometrica 75 (1), 
121-54. 
Fehr, E., List, J., 2004. The hidden costs and returns of incentives: Trust and trustworthiness 
among CEOs. Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (5), 743-71. 
Fehr, E., Rockenbach, B., 2003. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature 422 
(13) March, 137-40. 
Fischbacher, U., Fong,  C., Fehr, E., 2003. Fairness, errors, and the power of competition. Zurich, 
IERE Working Paper No 133. http://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp133.pdf 
Fong, C., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2005. Strong reciprocity and the welfare state.  In: Serge-
Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (Eds.). Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity, and 
Altrusim. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1439-1464. 
Frey, B. S., 1994. How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In. Rationality and Society 6 (3), 
334-52. 
Frey, B. S., 1997. A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues. Economic Journal 107 
(443), 1043-53. 
 26 
 
Frey, B. S., Jegen, R., 2001. Motivation Crowding Theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 15 (5), 
589-611 
Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., 1995. The Incompatibility of Incentive Compatible Devices 
and Ethical Behavior: Some Experimental Results and Insights. Public Choice Studies, 
25, 24-51. 
Gaechter, S., Falk, A., 2002. Reputation or Reciprocity? Consequences for the Labour Relation. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104 (1), 1 - 26. 
Gaechter, S., Kessler, E., Konigstein, M., 2007. Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of 
Voluntary Cooperation. University of Nottingham, School of Economics.  
http://www.eea-esem.com/EEA-ESEM/2006/Prog/viewpaper.asp?pid=2640 
Galbiati, R., Vertova, P., 2008. Obligations and Cooperative Behaviour in Public Good Games.  
Games and Economic Behavior, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004, in press. 
Galbiati, R., Vertova, P., 2008. Behavioral Effects of Obiligations. European University 
Institute: Firenze 
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., Fehr, E. (Eds), 2005. Moral sentiments and Material Interests: 
The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000a. A Fine is a Price. Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1), 1-17. 
Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000b. Pay enough or don't pay at all. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115 (2), 791-810. 
Hirschman, A. O., 1985. Against parsimony: three ways of complicating some categories of 
economic discourse. Economics and Philosophy 1(1), 7-21. 
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., Smith, V. L., 1994. Preferences, Property Rights, and 
Anonymity in Bargaining Games. Games and Economic Behavior 7 (3), 346-80. 
Hume, D., 1964. David Hume, The Philosophical Works. Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen. 
Irlenbusch, B., Sliwka, D., 2005. Incentives, Decision Frames and Motivation Crowding Out- An 
experimental Investigation. Discussion paper No 1758. 
Kahan, D. M., 1997. Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence. Virginia Law Review 83 
(2), 349- 95. 
Kreps, D. M., 1997. Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives. American Economic Review 
87 (2), 359-64. 
 27 
 
Laffont, J. J., Matoussi, M. S., 1995. Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints, and Share Cropping 
in El Oulja. Review of Economic Studies 62 (3), 381-99. 
Lazear, E., 2000. Performance Pay and Productivity. American Economic Review 90 (5),  1346 - 
61. 
Lipsey, R., Lancaster, K., 1956-1957. The General Theory of the Second Best. Review of  
Economic Studies 24 (1), 11-32. 
Mellstrom, C., Johannesson,  M., 2008. "Crowding out in blood donation: Was Titmus right?" 
American  Economic  Review, in press. 
Ostrom, E.,  2000. Crowding out Citizenship. Scandinavian Political Studies 23(1),  3-16. 
Pommerehne, W.W., Weck-Hannemann, H., 1996. Tax rates, tax administration and income tax 
evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice 88 (1-13), 161-70. 
Rodriguez-Sickert, C., Guzman, R. A., Cardenas, J. C., 2007. Institutions influence preferences: 
evidence from a common pool resource experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004 
Seabright, P., 2004. Continuous Preferences Cab Cause Discontinuous Choices: An Application 
to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism.  CEPR Discussion paper no. 4322 London. 
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4322.asp 
Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., 2007. Punishing free riders: Direct and indirect promotion of 
cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior 28, 330-39. 
Sobel, J., 2007. Do markets make people selfish? University of California at San Diego 
Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Titmuss, R. M., 1971. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1981. "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice." 
Science, 211:4481, 453-58. 
